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NARELL V. FREEMAN: THE NINTH CIRCUIT HAS
DELUSIONS ABOUT "ILLUSIONS OF LOVE."
I. INTRODUCTION
"Hard work pays off," "cheaters never prosper," "everyone gets
what they deserve." These expressions have been ingrained in our minds
since youth, and we have come to believe them as true. We have been
taught that hard work will be rewarded and "cheaters" will eventually be
punished. However, the decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Narell v. Freeman I demonstrates that these principles are not always
followed. In this case, one person's hard work did not pay off, and an-
other person's cheating was rewarded, rather than punished. In Narell,
the parties got quite the opposite of "what was deserved."
Because we are a society of advanced information and technology,
copyright is a very important area of the law.2 Consequently, issues re-
garding which works are copyrightable and what constitutes infringe-
ment of a copyright are becoming increasingly complex as modem
technology creates more avenues for authors to express their works.3
In Narell v. Freeman the court addressed a unique issue of alleged
copyright infringement.4 The Ninth Circuit held that Cynthia Freeman,
a popular romance novelist,5 did not infringe upon the copyright of an
historical novel when she copied several phrases directly and closely
paraphrased other sections of Irena Narell's novel in writing her own
1. 872 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1989).
2. "With today's new reproductive technologies anyone can reproduce and transmit a
copyrighted work cheaply and inexpensively." Several examples include photocopiers, VCR's,
and, in more recent years, FAX machines. M. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW
304 (1989).
3. For example, copyright law is at the forefront of computer hardware and software
issues. The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 was enacted to protect the copyrights
of semiconductor chips. Additionally, more and more courts are now being called upon to
interpret copyright law in relation to computer software. A key example is West Publishing
Company v. Mead Data Central, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), a case which involved
the copyrightability of automated data bases. In its holding, the court found Mead in violation
of copyright law when it copied the protected page numbering system of Westlaw.
4. Narell, 872 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1989).
5. Freeman's novels are available everywhere books are sold, including bookstores, drug
stores, airports and department stores. Some of Freeman's best sellers include: "A World Full
of Strangers," "Seasons of the Heart," "Portraits," "Come Pour the Wine," and most recently,
"The Last Princess." Freeman passed away on October 22, 1988, during the time period of
this case. She was 73 years old and died after a long bout with cancer. ORLOFSKY, THE
FACTS ON FILE YEARBOOK: THE INDEXED RECORD OF WORLD EVENTS VOL. XLVIII at 800
(1988).
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romance novel.6 The court primarily based its ruling upon three distinct
legal theories. First, the portions copied were not literary expression, but
were ordinary phrases and historical facts.7 Second, the two works in
question did not meet the requirement of substantial similarity.' Finally,
even if the works were substantially similar, the defendant's copying
would be allowed by the fair use doctrine defense.9
This note examines the Narell v. Freeman decision in light of cur-
rent copyright law and concludes that the court did not reach the correct
results for the following reasons: summary judgment was inappropriate,
the substantial similarity analysis was unnecessary, the substantial simi-
larity test was misapplied, and the fair use analysis was misconstrued.
The first issue addressed by the court is that of summary judgment.
Based on precedential cases and the leading trend in the law, cases like
Narell v. Freeman should be tried by a jury. The Narell court dispensed
with the case by granting Freeman summary judgment. Secondly, the
Narell court's analysis of the substantial similarity test is unnecessary in
such a case, where the defendant has already admitted copying portions
of the plaintiff's work. Even if conducting the substantial similarity
test ° were appropriate here, however, the conclusion was incorrect, for
the two works are inherently substantially similar. Finally, this note ad-
dresses the court's error in applying the four factors of the fair use
doctrine.
6. Narell, 872 F.2d at 915.
7. Id. at 907.
8. Substantial similarity is very difficult to define. This is partly because courts have used
the term "substantial similarity" in different contexts, and thus, the phrase has several different
meanings. Additionally, many judges are not well versed in the area, and, as a result, use
terms inconsistently (e.g. substantial similarity should be distinguished from striking similar-
ity, which implies more of a kind of similarity rather than a quantity of similarity). In the
context of Narell v. Freeman, the requirement of substantial similarity is used to prove copy-
right infringement. Generally, to say that two works are substantially similar is to say that the
second work embodies a substantial amount (an excessive appropriation) of the first work's
protected expression. A defendant can produce a work that is substantially similar to the
plaintiff's work by either copying portions verbatim or by taking the overall pattern and ar-
rangement of the work. [These two terms are commonly referred to as "verbatim similarity"
and "pattern similarity." However, Professor Nimmer in his treatise "Nimmer on Copy-
right," uses more complex terminology - "fragmented literal similarity" for verbatim similar-
ity and "non-fragmented comprehensive similarity" for pattern similarity. More and more
Nimmer's terminology is being seen in case law]. Several tests have been proposed and
adopted to help the courts determine whether two works are substantially similar. Some of
these tests (e.g. the intrinsic/extrinsic test) are discussed in this casenote. M. LEAFFER, supra,
note 2, at 268-70.
9. Narell, 872 F.2d at 907.
10. See supra note 8 for a discussion of substantial similarity.
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II. BRIEF HISTORY OF CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAW
Copyright law encourages the creation of literary and other works.1'
Moreover, copyright law functions as a mechanism to protect the works
of authors, musicians and other creative artists from having their works
copied by others.12 The notion of copyright protection in America dates
back to the adoption of the United States Constitution. The Copyright
Clause in the Constitution states that "Congress shall have the power
.. to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, but securing for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respec-
tive writings and discoveries. "13 Current copyright law is governed pri-
marily by the Copyright Act of 1976.14 When certain requirements are
satisfied, 15 the Act grants the copyright owner a private monopoly on the
work for a limited time 16 as well as the exclusive right to print, reprint,
amend, adapt, publish, copy and perform the copyrighted work.17
III. FACTS OF THE CASE
In 1981, Irena Narell published "Our City: The Jews of San Fran-
cisco" ("Our City"), an historical novel about the immigration of Jewish
families from Europe to California.18 Narell claimed her work was not
merely an historical novel because it embodied her own interpretation of
that period of immigration, offering her own experiences and family his-
11. Interview with Lionel Sobel, Professor of Law at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles
(Aug. 23, 1990).
12. In a sense, it could be said that everything is copied from something else and nothing is
original (e.g. a painting or a picture is copied from the original work). Thus, there must be
special meanings assigned to the word copying and particular rules to govern such situations.
Otherwise, every work would violate copyright laws. Id.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
14. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1990). However, the Copyright Act of
1909 still governs works that were published before the 1976 Act was enacted. Copyright Act
of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1977).
15. Such as notice and registration. Requirements were modified by the United States'
admission to the Berne Convention in March, 1989. In order to become a member of Berne,
the largest international copyright law convention, the U.S. had to modify the 1976 Act to
eliminate the requirements of notice and registration in order to comply with the Berne re-
quirements. Interview with Lionel Sobel, Professor of Law at Loyola Law School in Los An-
geles (Oct. 28, 1990).
16. The current duration of a copyright is generally the life of the author plus fifty years,
regardless of the date of publication of the work. However, the duration of copyright for
works published before 1978 and works made for hire is different. Since the works in Narell
are not works made for hire and were not published before 1978, the durations for those works
are omitted in this article. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
18. IRENA NARELL, OUR CITY: THE JEWS OF SAN FRANCISCO (1981).
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tory as a background. 9 In the story, Narell outlined Jewish immigration
to San Francisco, the creation and development of Jewish businesses and
industries, and the involvement of Jews in civic and cultural affairs. 20
Written in an anecdotal and narrative style, "Our City" has been de-
scribed as a "stunning social history and penetrating mass biography of
the Jewish families who since gold-rush days have left their mark on vir-
tually every facet of Bay area life."'" Narell copyrighted her book be-
cause she thought that it would protect her work from being
subsequently used by anyone else.22 Narell was mistaken.
2 3
Three years after the publication of "Our City," Cynthia Freeman, a
well known romance novelist, also wrote a book about the immigration
of Jewish families from Europe to California.24 Although her novel "Il-
lusions of Love" was purportedly fictional, 25 Freeman based the story on
the factual history of Jewish immigration, much like the subject matter
of "Our City."2 6 In fact, Freeman admitted that "Our City" became the
historical foundation for "Illusions of Love," and that she consulted no
other source when writing her novel. 27 Freeman's novel relates the story
of a fictional character, Ephraim Rothenberger, by tracing his life history
from his journey from Paris to San Francisco, where he ultimately be-
came a wealthy banker.28 The primary focus of the novel is the conflict
Rothenberger faces when he has to choose between his obligations to his
wife and family and his passion for a rediscovered lover from his past.29
However, the novel also includes a detailed history of Rothenberger's
19. Id.
20. Narell, 872 F.2d at 909.
21. Id.
22. Presumably this is what Narell thought. An author complies with the rules proscribed
by copyright law in order to protect his or her work from future infringement. Every author
relies on the fact that if they comply with the copyright laws, their works are protected against
infringement.
23. Obviously Narell was mistaken, as the court ruled in Freeman's favor, and Freeman
was allowed to copy portions of Narell's copyrighted work in the writing of her own novel.
24. C. FREEMAN, ILLUSIONS OF LOVE (1984).
25. In contrast with Narell's non-fictional work.
26. C. FREEMAN, ILLUSIONS OF LOVE (1984). For example, Chapters Two, Three and
Four (pages 15-44 of the paperback edition) describe the family background of Martin Roth,
the protagonist of the novel. In these chapters Freeman tells the life story of Ephraim
Rothenberger, Martin Roth's great-grandfather. She describes his immigration to America
from Paris, his participation in the Gold Rush, and his establishment of a wealthy family in
San Francisco.
27. Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1989) (No.
88-2491) (quoting from Freeman's Response to Interrogatory No. 5 of Plaintiff's First Set of
Interrogatories).
28. C. FREEMAN, ILLUSIONS OF LOVE (1984).
29. Narell, 872 F.2d at 909.
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immigration, which forms the foundation of his character, and recurs
throughout the entire novel.30
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE
Narell filed suit for copyright infringement in July of 1987, alleging
that Freeman had violated the Copyright Act of 1976 by copying por-
tions of "Our City" verbatim and by closely paraphrasing other portions
of the work.31 Freeman moved for summary judgment, maintaining that
no reasonable trier of fact could find her guilty of copyright infringe-
ment.32 On March 18, 1988, the district court granted her motion for
summary judgment on two separate grounds: 1) that the two works were
not substantially similar; and 2) that the use of the material from "Our
City" was protected by the fair use doctrine.
33
Narell appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in January of 1989. 3" The court of appeals upheld Freeman's motion for
summary judgment. 35 The court also concluded that Freeman had not
infringed upon Narell's copyright to "Our City" in the writing of her
novel "Illusions of Love.",
36
V. SUMMARY OF THE COURT OF APPEAL'S REASONING
The court of appeals based its ruling upon three separate and dis-
tinct legal theories. 37 First, the court held that there was no copyright
infringement because the portions that Freeman had copied from "Our
City" were not protected expression, but were merely ordinary phrases
and factual statements.38 Secondly, the court found that no substantial
similarity existed between the two works.39 Finally, the court affirmed
30. C. FREEMAN, ILLUSIONS OF LOVE (1984).
31. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 909 (9th Cir. 1989).
32. Id. at 909-10.
33. Id. at 909.
34. Narell, 872 F.2d at 907.
35. Id.
36. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 909 (9th Cir. 1989).
37. The basis for the three theories was twofold: first, the district court had focused upon
all three issues - that of protected expression, substantial similarity and fair use -- so the
court of appeals felt compelled to address all three issues. Second, the court believed that the
discussions of substantial similarity and fair use would offer additional support for the holding
that Freeman had not infringed upon Narell's work. In a special concurrence, Circuit Judge
Cynthia Holcomb Hall agreed that no protected expression was copied by Freeman, but felt it
was "unnecessary to reach the issues of substantial similarity and fair use." Id. at 915.
38. Narell, 872 F.2d at 911. It is commonly accepted that ordinary phrases and factual
statements are not protected by copyright law. See discussion infra.
39. Id at 913.
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the district court's position that Freeman's copying was protected by the
fair use doctrine.'
A. Basic Test for Copyright Infringement
Copyright infringement occurs when a third party violates one or
more of the copyright owner's exclusive rights as enumerated in Section
106 of the Copyright Act of 1976.41 These rights include the right to
reproduce the work, prepare adaptations and derivative works, distribute
and import the work, perform the work publicly, and display the work
publicly.42 The plaintiff in a copyright infringement case must prove that
the plaintiff owned the copyright for the work and that the defendant
copied the work.43 Courts generally accept circumstantial evidence of
copying," because there is rarely direct evidence of copying.45 In order
to make a circumstantial case for copying, the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant had access' to the work and that the two works are sub-
40. Id. at 915.
41. The Act states:
Subject to sections 107 through 119, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based
on the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending; (4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copy-
righted work publicly; and (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreo-
graphic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including
the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1990).
42. Id. There are also many limitations on the five basic exclusive rights. These limitations
are set forth in the Copyright Act of 1976 in §§ 110-117. However, as none of the limitations
on the exclusive rights apply to this case, they are neither discussed in the opinion of the court
nor this casenote.
43. M. LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 265-66. The word "copying" is confusing, for it refers to
more than one would expect. For example, the word "copying" also means unauthorized
distribution or display of a work, in addition to the traditional meanings one would expect. Id.
44. The circumstantial case is made by proving: (1) access and (2) substantial similarity. If
a sufficient circumstantial case is made, the burden of proof then shifts to the defendant to
disprove copying. M. LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 266.
45. Direct evidence would be where the defendant actually admits copying, as in Narell v.
Freeman (discussed supra), or where there is a witness that can attest to the fact that the
defendant copied. Direct evidence is rarely apparent, however, because it is uncommon for
someone to witness another person physically copying a work. Id.
46. To prove access, the plaintiff must show that the defendant had a "reasonable opportu-
nity to view" the work. A good example of this is Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs
Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). In this case, Bright Tunes claimed that Har-
risongs had infringed a popular song, "He's So Fine," which had been played extensively on
the radio. Although Harrisongs denied copying, the court ruled in favor of Bright Tunes,
finding a case of infringement. The court reasoned that Harrisongs had access to the copy-
[Vol. I11
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stantially similar. In Narell v. Freeman, the issues of Narell's ownership
of the copyright and Freeman's access to Narell's work are not in dis-
pute.47 Therefore, in order to sustain a successful action for copyright
infringement, Narell only needed to prove that Freeman copied protected
portions of "Our City" in writing "Illusions of Love."
B. Portions Copied Were Not Protected Expression
Narell v. Freeman is one of the rare cases where direct evidence of
copying existed, because Freeman admitted using portions of "Our City"
in writing "Illusions of Love." 48 Therefore, the court turned directly to
an analysis of the second issue: whether Freeman copied protected por-
tions49 of Narell's work.
The landmark case of Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enter-
prises"0 establishes that copyright law only protects an author's literary
expression, and not the facts and ideas within a work.5' In that case,
more commonly known as the "Ford Memoirs case," Nation Enterprises
obtained, through an undisclosed source, a stolen, unpublished manu-
script of former President Gerald Ford's autobiography, "A Time to
Heal."52 Time Magazine ("Time") had already negotiated a contract to
publish an excerpt from the autobiography, but Nation Enterprises pub-
lished their article before Time's scheduled publication.53 As a result,
Time subsequently cancelled its contract.54 Although much of the
court's opinion centered around the correct application of the fair use
doctrine, the opinion established that historical facts and theories may, in
fact, be copied.55
The opinion of Harper & Row has been followed by other courts,
which have held that the extension of copyright protection to historical
works is very narrow. 56 Consequently, the only elements protected in
righted work because of its popularity as a hit song. Thus, a defendant's alleged innocence is
not a defense where there is a "reasonable opportunity to view."
47. Narell, 872 F.2d at 910.
48. During a deposition, Freeman was asked: "[Dlid some of the language [in "Illusions
of Love"] come from Ms. Narell's book?" Freeman answered: "Possibly, probably ... un-
doubtedly, possibly, I don't know ... of course... some of it, sure ... yes . Narell, 872
F.2d at 910.
49. See Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109, n.3 (9th Cir. 1970),
where it was held that non protected material may be copied with impunity.
50. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
51. Id. at 547-48.
52. Id. at 542.
53. Id. at 543.
54. Id. at 539.
55. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
56. "The trend of the law is the erosion of protection for copyright owners, particularly in
1991]
L 0 YOLA ENTER TAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
such historical works are the author's original expression of particular
facts and ideas which have already entered the public domain." In
Narell, the court evaluated the portions of Narell's work copied by Free-
man and found that the portions were predominantly factual and, thus,
were not entitled to copyright protection.5 s Moreover, the court found
that the phrases which Freeman did copy directly were ordinary phrases
which were also not entitled to copyright protection.59
Thus, the court held that Freeman only took facts and ordinary
phrases from "Our City" and did not copy any protected expression.6°
The court found this conclusion to be adequate to support the district
court's ruling of summary judgment for the defendant. 6' However, the
court still addressed the issues of substantial similarity and fair use since
those issues were central to the matter before the district court.62 The
court also believed that such a discussion would "provide more support
for [their] holding."
'63
C. No Substantial Similarity Existed Between the Two Works
The Narell court found that even if the portions of "Our City" that
Narell copied were found to be protected elements, the claim of copy-
right infringement would still be unsuccessful because the two works are
not substantially similar.6 Determining substantial similarity of two
works is very difficult. Often, it is hard to determine when two works are
so alike that they are substantially similar.65 Also, it is difficult to distin-
guish between ideas, which are not protected, and expressions of ideas,
the area of non-fiction works." Hartnick, "Does Copyright Really Protect Nonfiction? Occa-
sionally Yes, but Mostly No!" Publisher's Weekly, Dec. 9, 1983 at 28-29. See also Hoehling v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1980), where the court held that "the
scope of copyright in historical accounts is narrow indeed, embracing no more than the au-
thor's original expression of particular facts and theories already in the public domain."
57. See Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037, and Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972,
974 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 481.
58. Narell, 872 F.2d at 911. For example, the court found that Freeman copied the rea-
sons why the Jews emigrated to America as well as the hardships they encountered. Addition-
ally, she copied details regarding the journey of Adolph Sutro, the distinguishing features of
San Francisco at the time of the emigration, and the established character of the Jewish reli-
gious and social functions. Id.
59. Id. Examples include: "rekindle old memories," "staggering network," "river wound
its way between muddy banks crawling with alligators," etc. Id
60. Narell, 872 F.2d at 912.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1989).
65. M. LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 270.
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which are protected." Several tests have been established to aid courts
in such a determination.67 In Narell, the court adopted the test estab-
lished in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions v. McDonald's
Corp., 68 which embodies two parts: an extrinsic test - the objective ele-
ment, as well as an intrinsic test - the subjective element.69
1. Extrinsic Test
In conducting the extrinsic test, or objective element, the trier of
fact determines whether the works are substantially similar with regard
to the general ideas embodied in the work.7" The extrinsic test compares
both works, to determine similarities in such areas as plot, theme, dia-
logue, mood, setting, pace, characters and sequence of events.7 The fo-
cus is not merely on basic plot ideas, which are usually not
copyrightable, but rather, on specific elements of the two works that
comprise the sequence of events and the relationships between the char-
acters.72 Additional elements which can be considered include: "[t]he
type of artwork involved, the materials used, the subject matter, and the
setting for the subject ... since it is an extrinsic test, analytic dissection
and expert testimony are appropriate.
73
In Narell, the court found that there was no substantial similarity
between the two works, as, on the whole, they bore only a "slight resem-
blance" to each other. 74 Narell's "Our City" was a factual work focusing
on historical facts of a particular time period.75 By contrast, Freeman's
"Illusions of Love" was a romance novel, with the central theme being a
66. The principle that there is no copyright protection for ideas in a work is codified in
§ 102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976, which denies copyright protection to:
Any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
67. See supra notes 64 to 93 and accompanying text for a more detailed analysis of the
history of the substantial similarity test.
68. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
69. Id. at 1164. In Sid & Marry Krofft, Sid & Marty Krofft, who owned the copyright to
"H.R. Pufnstuf," a childrens' television show, brought a copyright infringement suit against
McDonald's. Sid & Marty Krofft alleged that McDonald's had infringed upon "H.R. Pufn-
stuf" in the production of "McDonaldland" television commercials. Id at 1160-61.
70. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1989).
71. Id. These elements are aspects of a work which, when identical in two works, show a
high degree of similarity between the two works.
72. Narell, 872 F.2d at 912.
73. Sid & Marty Krofft v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
74. Narell, 872 F.2d at 912.
75. Id.
1991]
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love story.76 Primary emphasis in "Illusions of Love" was placed upon
the thoughts, feelings and actions of the characters.77 Accordingly, the
Narell court held that "[t]he fact that both books touch upon the move-
ment of the Jews from Europe to San Francisco and the social relations
of wealthy Jewish families in the Bay Area78 is not enough to establish
substantial similarity."79
2. Intrinsic Test
Having found that the works were not substantially similar under
the extrinsic test, the court applied the intrinsic, or subjective test.8 ° This
test is applied to determine whether the forms of expression of two works
are substantially similar, depending on the response of an ordinary, rea-
sonable reader.8" Neither expert testimony nor detailed dissection of the
works is a proper basis for the intrinsic analysis.8 2 Rather, the trier of
fact should rely on spontaneous initial reaction to the works.83 To con-
stitute infringement, the "total concept and feel" of the works must be
substantially similar, 4 according to Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card
Co. ("Roth "). 5
InRoth, both the plaintiff and defendant were corporations that pro-
duced and distributed greeting cards.8 6 Roth brought suit against United
Card Company, which allegedly infringed upon the design of seven dif-
ferent greeting cards.8 7 The district court ruled for Roth, but the appel-
late court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. 8 The
appellate court held that the greeting cards subsequently produced by
United were substantially similar because of the "remarkable resem-
blance" between the two works.8 9
In Narell, however, the court found that the "total concept and feel"
of the two works was completely different - one work being a fictional
76. Id.
77. Id. at 912.
78. The Bay Area is a term used to describe San Francisco and surrounding areas.
79. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1989).
80. Id. at 913.
81. Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985).
82. M. LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 273.
83. Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933).
84. Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052
(1985).
85. 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970).
86. Id. at 1107.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1111.
89. Id. at 1107 and 1110.
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romance novel and the other being a non-fictional historical account.90
The court found that while Freeman may have incorporated some of the
historical facts from "Our City" into her own novel, she neither used the
material in the same manner, nor prominently featured such material. 91
Thus, the court held that "because of the fundamental differences be-
tween the two works and the insubstantial nature of the copied passages,
no reasonable reader could conclude that the works were substantially
similar." '92 Accordingly, summary judgment on the issue of substantial
similarity was affirmed.93
D. Fair Use Doctrine
Under certain circumstances, the fair use doctrine allows copying or
adopting copyrighted material in a reasonable manner, without the con-
sent or permission of the copyright owner.94 This doctrine is the most
common and important equitable defense to an action for copyright in-
fringement. 95 While the doctrine has long been recognized in common
law copyright cases, 96 it was not defined by statute until the Copyright
Act of 1976.97
Section 107 of the Copyright Act does not actually attempt to define
the doctrine; it merely lists four factors that may be considered in evalu-
ating whether or not a particular instance of copying falls under the doc-
trine. These four factors include:
(1) The purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educa-
tional purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.98
90. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1989).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. M. LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 294.
96. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05, at 13-62.43 (1990). The doctrine
was first articulated in 1841 in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). In
Folsom, the court identified several criteria to be used to determine if a fair use defense was
appropriate. Interestingly, the criteria set forth in this case were the same factors listed by the
Copyright Act of 1976. M. LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 295.
97. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
98. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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The wording of the Act implies that the list of four factors is meant to be
illustrative, not exhaustive.99 Thus, a court has the discretion to decide
which factors should be weighed more heavily, and whether additional
factors should be considered. Consequently, the fair use doctrine has
been interpreted in an illogical and inconsistent manner.'0o
The Narell court evaluated the infringement claim in light of the fair
use doctrine in order to support their position that Freeman was not lia-
ble for copyright infringement.'°" First, the court evaluated the purpose
and character of the use. 102 This first factor is similar to the preamble of
the fair use doctrine, 0 3 in that it emphasizes the distinction between
commercial"° and non-profit or educational use.'05 This factor weighed
strongly in favor of Narell because Freeman's use of the copied material
was obviously commercial, and "commercial use of copyrighted material
is presumptively unfair."'I 6 The doctrine favors those who use the cop-
ied material for education or non-profit purposes,' 0 7 but this was not the
case in Narell.
Secondly, the court considered the nature of the copyrighted
work.'0o The policy underlying this second factor is to support the inter-
est of the public and afford the public greater access to some kinds of
works than others, such as scientific, biographical or informational
works."°9 This is in contrast to works for purely entertainment or com-
mercial purposes. The Narell court followed the rule that the scope of
99. M. LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 298. Consequently, the trier of fact may take into ac-
count other factors such as "lack of good faith . .. [and] industry custom or practice." Id.
100. For example, consider Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539
(1985). In that case, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion applies the fair use doctrine very
differently from Justice Brennan's dissent. This demonstrates that different judges interpret
the criteria differently, which leads to a lack of continuity in the results.
101. Narell, 872 F.2d at 913.
102. Id. at 913-14.
103. The preamble states, in pertinent part: "The fair use of a copyrighted work... for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1990).
104. A commercial use is one which earns a profit.
105. M. LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 299.
106. Narell, 872 F.2d at 913, (quoting Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-51 (1984)). "If the intended use is for commercial gain, that
likelihood of future harm may be presumed." Id.
107. This would include use in a classroom or other learning environment. For a good
example, see Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (the "Betamax
case," 464 U.S. 417 (1984)). In that case, private non-commercial taping of "free" television
programming for time shifting purposes was found to be a fair use.
108. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 914 (9th Cir. 1989).
109. M. LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 301.
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permissible fair use is greater with an informational work than a creative
work. 110 Thus, the court weighed the nature of the work factor slightly
in Freeman's favor, but found Narell's "Our City" to contain enough
creative expression that any use of it was not presumptively fair.11
The court then considered the amount and substantiality of copied
portions used."I2 This third factor "focuses on whether the defendant
has taken more [of the plaintiff's work] than is necessary to satisfy the
specific fair use purpose."' 3 To determine the amount and substantiality
of portions used, an analysis very similar to the substantial similarity
analysis is applied.' Therefore, the court simply repeated its analysis of
the substantial similarity test and determined that no substantial similar-
ity exists between the two works." 5 This factor strongly favored Free-
man's position. 1
1 6
Finally, the court considered the effect on the market, which is gen-
erally regarded by courts as the most important element of fair use, and
gave it the most weight." 17 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that
the defendant's alleged copyright infringement will have an adverse effect
on the value or marketability of the plaintiff's work."18 The court found
that this factor weighed significantly in favor of Freeman, as it could not
be proven that Freeman's use of some portions of "Our City" would have
any bearing on the future marketability of the work.911 It can be inferred
that Narell believed that the use of portions of "Our City" in "Illusions
of Love" might have an adverse effect on the future marketability of
"Our City," however, the court felt that this proposition was unsubstan-
tiated. 2 ° In fact, the court even found that the use of "Our City" in
"Illusions of Love" might actually enhance the marketability and sales of
110. Narell, 872 F.2d at 914.
111. Id
112. Id
113. M. LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 302.
114. The key distinction is that the fair use defense only arises after infringement has been
proven, whereas the substantial similarity analysis is used to actually prove infringement.
115. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 914 (9th Cir. 1989).
116. Id
117. Id. (quoting Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 566
(1985)).
118. Id. This is implied from the following statement of the court: "Given Freeman's com-
mercial use of Narell's material, the likelihood of future harm may be presumed... the copy-
right owner [plaintiff] need only show that should the challenged use become widespread, it
would adversely affect the potential market for the work." (emphasis added) Id.
119. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 914 (9th Cir. 1989).
120. Id
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"Our City."' 12 1 Thus, the court weighed all four factors to find that the
copied portions of Narell's work in Freeman's novel fell under the pro-
tection of the fair use doctrine. 1
22
VI. ANALYSIS
1. The Granting of Summary Judgment was Inappropriate
Granting summary judgment in Narell was an inappropriate
method of resolving the dispute. Rather, the case should have been tried
by a jury. Many Ninth Circuit decisions substantiate this position.
123
The leading case disfavoring summary judgment in copyright infringe-
ment actions is Arnstein v. Porter. 124 In Arnstein, the court held that it
would limit summary judgment based on lack of similarity to obvious
cases of similarity, such as where "Ravel's 'Bolero' or Shostakovitch's
'Fifth Symphony' were alleged to infringe 'When Irish Eyes Are
Smiling.' "125
In Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc. ("Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox"), the court held that summary judgment was inappropriate
because reasonable minds could differ as to whether the television series
"Battlestar Galactica" infringed on the motion picture Star Wars. 126
Specifically, the court held that "since substantial similarity is usually an
extremely close question of fact, summary judgment has traditionally
been disfavored in copyright litigation."' 27 Twentieth Century Fox is
analogous to Narell, in that both cases involve complex issues centered
around the extent of similarity. In Twentieth Century Fox, the trier of
fact had to determine whether two science fiction movies were similar. 128
It was a difficult task, as at first appearance the works seemed similar.
But, whether they were substantially similar required a more in-depth
analysis. In Narell both works are novels. Both works involve story
lines about the immigration of Jews from Europe to California. How-
ever, to determine whether or not "Our City" and "Illusions of Love"
are substantially similar would require a more detailed analysis. This
intricate analysis should be conducted by a jury.
121. Id. "If an author of a novel used Narell's work and was honorable enough to acknowl-
edge sources, such a use might enhance sales of 'Our City.'" Id. (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 915.
123. See infra notes 124 to 152 and accompanying text.
124. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
125. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.10, at 12-75, n.15.
126. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir.
1983).
127. Id. at 1330 n.6.
128. Id. at 1328.
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A similar view was espoused in Frybarger v. International Business
Machines Corp. ("Frybarger"). 2 9 In Frybarger, the court of appeals af-
firmed the district court's award of summary judgment. 130 However, it is
evident from the holding that:
[S]ummary judgment on the issue of substantial similarity is
only appropriate if, after viewing the evidence and drawing
every inference in the light most favorable to the non moving
party, the court concludes that no reasonable jury could find
substantial similarity of both ideas and expression between the
works at issue. (Emphasis added).
1 3 1
In Narell, a reasonable juror might have found that substantial similarity
existed because of the nature of the two works and the direct copying.
Freeman's admissions of direct copying 32 in her deposition directly es-
tablish that portions of "Our City" were reproduced verbatim in "Illu-
sions of Love."' 3 3 A juror could easily find these instances to support
substantial similarity. Additionally, Narell's argument that Freeman
copied protected expressive elements of "Our City" deserves closer atten-
tion from a jury. During argument at trial, Narell's counsel quoted lines
from "The Ride of Paul Revere" to demonstrate that history can be re-
counted expressively. 134 The court agreed that the history recounted in
the poem was expressive, and, consequently, that the direct copying of
the lines of the poem would constitute infringement, if the original work
held a valid copyright registration.' 35 The court obviously felt that the
expression of historical facts in "Our City" was not identical to that of
"The Ride of Paul Revere."' 136 However, a determination of whether
historical facts are being described expressively or not constitutes a mate-
rial issue of fact. Thus, this issue alone merits a jury trial in this case.
Therefore, summary judgment was clearly inappropriate.
37
129. 812 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1987).
130. Id. at 527.
131. Id. at 528.
132. See infra note 154 (excerpt from Freeman's deposition).
133. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 910 (9th Cir. 1989).
134. Narell's counsel quoted:
Listen, my children, and you shall hear,
Of the midnight ride of Paul Revere,
On the eighteenth of April, in Seventy-five;
Hardly a man is now alive
Who remembers that famous day and year.
Id. at 912 (quoting Longfellow, H.W. The Landlord's Tale (Paul Revere's Ride) in POEMS OF
HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW 310 (1943)).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1984), which held that "Sub-
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Several cases have implied that the substantial similarity test is bet-
ter conducted by a jury than by the court. In Baxter v. MCA, 138 the
plaintiff, Leslie Baxter, had composed a collection of seven songs that
were intended to portray different emotions.1 39 One of the songs was
entitled "Joy," and was recorded and published by Capitol Records in
1954, on an album entitled "The Passions.""' In 1982, John Williams, a
successful composer and conductor of music, composed the theme song
for the movie E T 4 ' Baxter filed suit against Williams for copyright
infringement, alleging that the theme from E T was largely copied from
the song "Joy" to which Williams had access and knowledge.
142
Although the district court granted summary judgment for Williams, the
court of appeals reversed, holding that summary judgment was pre-
cluded in such a copyright action.'4 3 Specifically, the court emphasized
that:
determinations of substantial similarity of expression are subtle
and complex. No bright line rule exists as to what quantum of
similarity is permitted before crossing [the line] into the realm
of substantial similarity... [thus], the ear of the court must
yield to the ears of jurors . . . [E]ven if a copied portion be
relatively small in proportion to the entire work, if qualitatively
important, the finder of fact may properly find substantial simi-
larity. (emphasis added).'"
A more recent ninth circuit decision, Levine v. McDonald's ("Le-
vinel")'4 (decided after Narell) substantiates the position that cases such
as Narell should be tried by a jury.'4 In Levine, the plaintiffs brought a
copyright infringement action against McDonald's, alleging that Mc-
Donald's used Levine's song "Life Is a Rock" in a McDonald's commer-
cial. '47 The court held that summary judgment should be denied because
stantial similarity is usually an extremely close issue of fact and summary judgment has been
disfavored [in such a case]." See also Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569, 571 (9th
Cir. 1987), where the court maintained that "summary judgment is disfavored on the substan-
tial similarity issue in copyright cases."
138. 812 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1987).
139. Id. at 422.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Baxter v. MCA, 812 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1987).
144. Id. at 424-25.
145. 735 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
146. Although the case is not a ninth circuit decision, it can be applied to Narell by analogy.
147. 735 F. Supp. at 93.
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triable issues of fact existed.' 4 Specifically, the court found that "a court
must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against
the moving party."' 14 9 Similarly, in Narell, several triable issues of fact
existed, such as whether Freeman copied enough of "Our City" to con-
stitute substantial similarity. Because there were inherent ambiguities in
Narell, a jury should have been entitled to resolve the dispute.
Therefore, summary judgment in a copyright infringement case is
only appropriate if the court can conclude that no reasonable jury could
find substantial similarity of both ideas and expression between the works
at issue. "° The court erred in making this conclusion in Narell. There
are undeniably similarities between "Our City" and "Illusions of Love."
The question is whether the similarities are substantial. There were too
many instances of direct copying and strong paraphrasing to conclusively
determine that the two works were not substantially similar.'' This
point is further exemplified by the wording of the majority opinion. The
court stated: "Most of the phrases Freeman copied from Narell are com-
monly used expressions."' 52 Most, but not all? The court's failure to
state conclusively, that the only portions of "Our City" which Freeman
copied directly were ordinary expression, indicates a lack of certainty.
With such an obvious lack of certainty, the court was wrong in granting
summary judgment; rather, such a decision would have been better eval-
uated by a jury. A jury may have found that the two works were or were
not substantially similar, but it is erroneous to conclude that no reason-
able juror could find substantial similarity. It was fundamentally unfair
to deny Narell her inherent right to a jury trial. The fact that the court
continued to engage in an analysis of the fair use doctrine indicates that
they were uncertain about whether there was no substantial similarity,
and, thus, sought further support for their ruling.
2. The Court's Analysis of Substantial Similarity was Misplaced
Courts have held that where there is direct evidence of copying
copyright infringement is automatically found and the substantial simi-
larity test is not required. ' 3 In this case, Freeman admitted in her depo-
sition that she "took" portions of "Our City" and incorporated such
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Frybarger v. International Business Machines Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir.
1987).
151. Narell, 872 F.2d at 911.
152. Id.
153. See infra notes 155 to 168 and accompanying text.
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portions into "Illusions of Love." 154 Thus, a prima facie case of in-
fringement has been established in Narell by Freeman's own concessions;
any further analysis is unnecessary. This proposition is strongly sup-
ported by case law.
In Rural Telephone Service Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc. ("Rural
Telephone"),'"5 a public utility providing telephone service brought a
copyright action against a telephone directory publisher, alleging copying
of Rural Telephone's "white pages."1 5 6 In Rural Telephone, as in Narell,
Feist Publications admitted in their deposition that they had copied the
work of Rural Telephone.'57 The district court in Rural Telephone, ac-
cepting this admission as concrete evidence of copying, ruled in favor of
Rural Telephone.' Thus, the Rural Telephone court held that: "the
'substantial similarity' test is used when there is no direct evidence of
copying.159 Because there was direct evidence of copying in Rural Tele-
phone, we need not resort to an analysis of whether there was substantial
similarity between the two directories."'"
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc. ("Broderbund")1
61
also supports this position. Broderbund Software, Inc., was the copy-
right holder and exclusive licensee of "The Print Shop," a computer
154. This excerpt was obtained from Freeman's deposition, taken on Sept. 11, 1987, at 37-
39:
Q: Did some of the language [in "Illusions of Love"] on page 25 come from Ms.
Narell's book?
A: Possibly, probably.
Q: [referring to page 28] Did some of the language on the top half of that page
come from Ms. Narell's book?
A: Of course.
Q: And the bottom half of that page, did some of the language on the bottom half
come from Ms. Narell's book?
A: Some of it, sure.
Q: Turning to page 34, did some of that language come from Ms. Narell's book?
A: Of course, yes, um-hum.
Q: And referring to the bottom paragraph on page 35 [that continues to the top of
page 36], did that language come from Ms. Narell's book?
A: Yes.
Q: Is there any other language in your book that came from Ms. Narell's book?
A: Absolutely not.
Q: Those are the only passages?
A: That's correct.
155. 663 F. Supp. 214 (D.Kan. 1987).
156. Id. at 216.
157. Id. at 218.
158. Id.
159. Rural Telephone Service Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214, 218 (D.Kan.
1987).
160. Id.
161. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D.Cal. 1986).
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software printing program. 62 Unison World, Inc., marketed a similar
software program called "Printmaster."'163 Broderbund sued Unison for
infringement, alleging that "Printmaster" infringed Broderbund's copy-
right on "The Print Shop."'' Broderbund argued that the overall ap-
pearance, structure and sequence of the "Printmaster" program were
substantially similar to that of "Printshop."'' 65 The court held that the
case was "exceptional" in that the plaintiff produced sufficient direct evi-
dence of copying to establish substantial similarity and, in turn, infringe-
ment.' 66 The court recognized that such direct evidence was enough to
constitute a successful claim for copyright infringement, but nevertheless
engaged in a substantial similarity analysis, merely "[iln the interest of
creating a comprehensive record."' 1 67 It is not important that the court
conducted a substantial similarity test, however, because it did not
change the court's decision that infringement had occurred. 68 In con-
trast, the Narell court completely disregarded the fact that the direct evi-
dence of copying proved infringement. 69  Freeman should have been
found guilty of infringement based on this direct evidence; the substantial
similarity test was unnecessary.
70
3. The Court Erred in Applying the Substantial Similarity Analysis
A different two step process for determining substantial similarity
162. Id. at 1129-30.
163. Id. at 1130.
164. Id. at 1129-30.
165. Id. at 1130.
166. Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1135 (N.D.Cal.
1986).
167. Id. at 1136.
168. Id.
169. This is evidenced by the fact that although the court conceded, based on Freeman's
own admissions, that Freeman had copied portions of "Our City," the court still found no
infringement. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 910-11 (9th Cir. 1989).
170. See M. Kramer Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 445 (4th Cir. 1986), where
the court reversed a district court decision that ignored the direct evidence of copying
presented at trial. After applying the substantial similarity test, the district court held that
there was no infringement. In reversing the lower court decision, the court of appeals stated
that "[tihe district court, however, lost sight of the ultimate issue - whether defendant copied
the plaintiff's game. If there was clear proof of actual copying by defendant, that is the end of
the case." Id. at 445. See also Koontz v. Jaffarian, 617 F. Supp. 1108, 1115 (E.D.Va. 1985),
aff'd, 787 F.2d 906, 910 (4th Cir. 1986) (infringement was found where copying was admitted;
the court did not engage in a substantial similarity analysis because the evidence presented was
more than sufficient to support a finding of copyright infringement); and Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co. v. Nationwide Independent Directory Service, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 900, 906
(W.D.Ark. 1974) (evidence of copying was held to be sufficient for finding of infringement; the
substantial similarity test was not applied).
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has been proposed in other circuits.171 The first step is to decide whether
there is a similarity of protectable material.172 The second step asks if
those similarities are excessive. 17 3 Thus, in order for there to be substan-
tial similarity, there must be an excessive appropriation of protectable
expression. 174
The court in Narell held that "[b]ecause of the fundamental differ-
ences between the works and the insubstantial nature of the copied
passages, no reasonable reader could conclude that the works [were] sub-
stantially similar." 175 In Narell, there were elements both of verbatim 
76
and of pattern similarity. 177 Thus, the substantial similarity of the two
works should depend upon the quantity of what was copied as well as the
importance of what was taken. 17 1 In this case there is a similarity of
protected material, as Freeman admittedly copied several portions of
"Our City.' ' 179 Moreover, the similarities between "Our City" and "Illu-
sions of Love" are excessive.' 80 Finally, the portions copied by Freeman
were qualitatively significant, as they spanned the entire theme of
Narell's novel. Accordingly, a closer look at the two works and the case
law governing such actions suggests that the court was incorrect in its
analysis of substantial similarity and its conclusion that none existed.
The test for substantial similarity has undergone many radical
changes since its inception."'8 The original test for substantial similarity
was the abstractions test, made famous by Judge Learned Hand in Nich-
ols v. Universal Pictures Corp. 182 The abstractions test was used to draw
the line between idea and expression.' 83 When it became apparent that
the abstractions test was insufficient for determining substantial similar-
ity,184 the courts adopted an ordinary observer or audience test.' 8 5 In
171. Interview with Lionel Sobel, Professor of Law at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles
(Oct. 18, 1990).
172. Thus, if the only material copied is unprotected material, then there is no substantial
similarity. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1989).
176. Where the second work exactly copied a little bit of the first work.
177. Where the second work embodies a lot of the first work, but not exactly.
178. Interview with Lionel Sobel, Professor of Law at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles
(Oct. 23, 1990).
179. Narell, 872 F.2d at 910.
180. See infra note 198.
181. See supra note 8 for a brief definition of substantial similarity, and notes 64 to 93 and
accompanying text.
182. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
183. M. LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 271.
184. Generally, the abstractions test is insufficient because it often does not clearly indicate
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applying this test, the court neither hears expert testimony, nor dissects
the two works.' 8 6 Rather, the test is based solely on the subjective reac-
tions of lay observers." 7 However, because there were also significant
problems with this test,188 courts adopted the bifurcated tests which are
currently used in the substantial similarity analysis.8 9 Although this
two-part approach to the substantial similarity analysis originated in
Arnstein v. Porter, I9I the current test is a modified version of the test
proposed in Sid & Marty Krofft v. McDonald's Corp. 9'
The portions of "Our City" admittedly copied by Freeman encom-
pass the entire theme of Narell's book: the immigration of the Jews from
European ghettos to positions of prominent wealth and status in San
Francisco. 92 Many courts have held that the qualitative significance of
the portions of plaintiff's work copied by the defendant controls, not
merely the quantity. 9 ' Thus, the fact that portions of "Our City" are
only included in three chapters of "Illusions of Love" is insignificant.
This position is supported by Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation
Enterprises ("Harper & Row"). 94 In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court
held that copying may not be excused merely because it is insubstantial
with respect to the infringing work. 95 As Judge Learned Hand cogently
remarked, "no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of
the difference between taking ideas and taking expression. The test is especially inadequate
when applied to visual works, music, factual works and computer programs. M. LEAFFER,
supra note 2, at 271-72.
185. Id. at 273.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. M. LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 274, where the author discusses some problems known
to exist when the court relies on this test. Examples include:
(1) Expression of an author's work in a different medium often hides resemblances
between the two works to an untrained eye.
(2) The trier of fact may not distinguish between the copying of ideas and the copy-
ing of expression.
(3) The trier of fact may fail to analyze properly whether a work was independently
created.
189. The bifurcated tests are two-part analyses which first examine the works from an ob-
jective point of view and then from a subjective point of view. M. LEAFFER, supra note 2, at
274-76.
190. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
191. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). See supra notes 68 to 93 and accompanying text for a
thorough discussion of how the Narell court applies the Krofft extrinsic/intrinsic test. The
purpose of this section is to show how the test was misapplied.
192. Narell, 872 F.2d at 909.
193. Interview with Lionel Sobel, Professor of Law at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles
(Oct. 23, 1990).
194. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). See supra notes 50 to 57 and accompanying text.
195. Id.
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his work he did not pirate." '196 Moreover, when the expression of one
author is qualitatively copied by another, a shift in genre does not excuse
the copier from liability. Freeman cannot escape liability for infringe-
ment merely by reworking "Our City" into a romance novel. Several
cases have affirmed this view that a change in medium of expression is no
defense to infringement.197
In addition to Freeman's use of the theme of "Our City," Freeman
also closely paraphrased substantial portions of Narell's book. 9 ' The
portions of "Our City" copied by Freeman were more than mere histori-
cal facts. Rather, these portions entered the realm of protected literary
expression. 99 Since a plagiarist cannot escape liability by paraphrasing
and rearranging another author's words,2"° the court's analysis that there
was no substantial similarity was misconstrued here.
Often elements of dissimilarity are sometimes actually evidence of
196. Id. at 565 (quoting Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56, cert.
denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936)).
197. See Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1986) (ballet infringed by still
photographs); King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1924) (cartoon
character infringed by toy doll); Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 509 F. Supp. 60
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 668 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1981) (books infringed by movies).
198. The following demonstrates examples of such close paraphrasing:
"From petty shopkeepers they soon transformed themselves into department store
magnates, international bankers, real estate developers," became "they elevated
themselves from petty shopkeepers to department store magnates, from smalltime
lenders to international bankers, from tentmakers to real estate developers;"
"The river wound its way between muddy banks crawling with alligators," became
"the shallow river wound its way between muddy banks crawling with alligators;"
"Marriages among the pioneer clans produced a staggering network of intricate in-
terconnection," became "marriage among these pioneers produced a staggering net-
work of family connections;"
"Freed from the ghettos by the French Revolution . . . but still barred from ...
owning land, subject to stringent regulations," became "Freed from the ghetto by
Napoleon after the French Revolution... they were forbidden to own land... and
were subjected to even more rigid regulations;"
"America already spelled Freedom," became "America was a word called Free-
dom;" "In spite of warnings from those who had found the voyage unbearable,"
became "this in spite of the warnings of those who said the ordeals of the voyage
were beyond endurance;"
"Mosquitoes feasted on his flesh," became "mosquitoes ravished his flesh;"
"Tents, shanties, and corrugated steel shacks were crowded together... the beach
was strewn with boxes, bales, trunks, suitcases and barrels of flour," became "tents,
shanties and corrugated-iron shacks were crowded together.., the beach was strewn
with boxes, bales of cotton, barrels of sugar and sacks of flour and cornmeal."
All excerpts were taken from Narell's "Our City" and Freeman's "Illusions of Love." My
special thanks to Daniel H. Bookin of Farella, Braun & Martel in San Francisco, attorney for
Narell, whose assistance was invaluable in locating such passages. (Excerpts were obtained
from Bookin's Appellant's Opening Brief at 15-16, Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907 (9th Cir.
1989) (No. 88-2491)).
199. Id.
200. See M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[B][1][b] at 13-50 (1990).
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copying. According to Nimmer: "[w]here the language used in two
works is the same but for the inversion of certain words or the substitu-
tion of one word for another, it has been held that this crude effort to
give the appearance of dissimilarity is itself evidence of copying." ''
Freeman obviously paraphrased a great deal of "Our City."202 Her
concerted effort to disguise the similarities demonstrates her awareness
that she knew she was copying, and more importantly, that she knew she
was wrong.
The famous case Salinger v. Random House ("Salinger") °3 exem-
plifies the point that fragmented paraphrasing can constitute copyright
infringement. In Salinger, J.D. Salinger, a well known author, claimed
that his unpublished memoirs were copied without permission by Ran-
dom House, who published an article on Salinger's life. 2" The court of
appeals reversed the district court's holding for Random House. 20 5 It
found that copying of more than a minimal amount of expressive content
constituted infringement. 20 6 The court of appeals rejected the district
court's conclusion that Random House had merely employed cliches or
word combinations that were so ordinary that they did not qualify for
protection. 20 7 Rather, it concluded that copyright protection should be
afforded to an author's analysis or interpretation of events and the way
an author structures his materials, facts and choices of words.20 8 It is
this structuring of facts, interpretation of events, and unique presentation
of historical information for which Narell seeks protection. This is a
question for a jury to decide at trial, not for a judge to decide on a motion
for summary judgment.2 °9
4. The Court Misconstrued the Fair Use Doctrine Defense
a. Purpose & Character of the Use
The application of the fair use doctrine as a defense for Freeman's
copying was inappropriate in Narell.2 " The first factor - the purpose
201. Id.
202. See supra note 198 for proof of direct evidence of copying by Freeman.
203. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 213 (1987).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 98.
207. Id.
208. Salinger v. Random House, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 213 (1987)
(citing Wainright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95-96 (2d Cir.
1977)).
209. See supra notes 123 to 152 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 94 to 122 and accompanying text for a detailed account of the history
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and character of the use - weighs strongly in Narell's favor.21' The
purpose of the fair use doctrine is to promote research and scholarly
work.212 Freeman's novel does not fall under the category of research or
scholarly work.21 3 Rather, Freeman's novel is a romance novel, written
solely for entertainment, as well as profit, purposes.214 Thus, Freeman's
novel was undisputably commercial in nature. Because courts are not
required to give sole consideration to the factors outlined in Section 107
of the Copyright Act,2 5 many courts have considered aspects other than
whether the use is a commercial or non-profit educational use.2" 6 One
factor commonly considered is whether the use of the plaintiff's work
was made in good faith.21 7 Bad faith has been found where the defendant
has engaged in copying without any effort to obtain permission from the
copyright owner or to cite the copyright owner as the source of the
material.21
In Marcus v. Rowley,219 a public school teacher, who was the owner
of a registered copyright to a book on cake decorating, filed a suit for
copyright infringement against a teacher who used some of the copy-
righted material in preparing an instruction book for a class on cake dec-
orating.220 The court found that defendant's work was used for the same
purpose as plaintiff's and it was bad faith for the defendant to neglect to
obtain permission for use of the material.22" ' Specifically, the court held:
"Because fair use presupposes that the defendant has acted fairly and in
good faith, the propriety of the defendant's conduct should also be
weighed in analyzing the purpose and character of the use."
' 2 22
Similarly, Freeman's use of "Our City" was in bad faith. Freeman
admittedly used Narell's work, without attempting to contact Narell to
ask for permission. Moreover, Freeman failed to cite Narell as the
of the fair use doctrine, the factors of the doctrine, and the manner in which the court applied
the doctrine in Narell v. Freeman.
211. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1989).
212. Interview with Lionel Sobel, Professor of Law at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles
(Oct. 23, 1990).
213. 17 U.S.C. § 107. The preamble lists several examples of cases where the fair use de-
fense should play a role. These examples include "criticism, comment, news reporting, teach-
ing, scholarship or research." Id.
214. Narell, 872 F.2d at 914.
215. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
216. M. LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 300.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. 695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983).
220. Id. at 1173.
221. Id. at 1175-76.
222. Id.
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source of the material, which would have been very easy for her to do.
Furthermore, the court's opinion stated that: "If an author of a novel
used Narell's work and was honorable enough to acknowledge sources,
such a use might enhance sales of 'Our City.'" (emphasis added).
223
Consequently, the decision in Narell implies that it is honorable to ac-
knowledge sources used in the creation of a work.224 However, the court
neglects to mention that it was dishonorable for Freeman to fail to men-
tion Narell as a source for "Illusions of Love," even when she admitted
that it was the only work she consulted in writing her novel.
b. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The position that historical facts are not copyrightable is widely ac-
cepted.225 However, the position that the original expression of such an
idea, fact, principle or discovery is protected by copyright law also has
support. 226 The Narell court found that Freeman had only copied facts
and ordinary phrases from Narell, but not protected expression.227 How-
ever, a closer examination of the two works indicates that Freeman cop-
ied a substantial portion of expression, in addition to historical fact.228
Moreover, the court ignored the fact that "Our City" was not written as
a purely historical novel, but rather, was "written in an anecdotal, narra-
tive style."' 229 Therefore, although Freeman was entitled to appropriate
the historical facts found in "Our City," she was not entitled to present
Narell's unique expressions as her own.
In an analogous case, Radji v. Khakba, 230 an Iranian newspaper
translated and published excerpts of an autobiography of the Shah of
Iran's ambassador to Great Britain.23 1 The court held that the unique
223. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 914 (9th Cir. 1989). The court mentioned this in
reference to the fact that Freeman's use of "Our City" might actually foster the marketability
of "Our City." Id.
224. Id.
225. Under § 101(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976, there is no copyright protection for an
idea, concept, fact, principle or discovery. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b). See also Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954), Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1879), and 1 M. NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03[d] (1980).
226. See Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir.
1984) (where the court held that historical facts and theories may be copied, as long as the
defendant does not "bodily appropriate" the expression of the plaintiff), and Rubin v. Boston
Magazine Co., 645 F.2d 80, 82 (1981) (where the court held that there may be a valid copy-
right on an original form of expression of an idea, concept or discovery).
227. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1989).
228. See supra note 198.
229. Narell, 872 F.2d at 909.
230. 607 F. Supp. 1296 (D.D.C. 1985).
231. Id. at 1299.
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expression of historical fact in the autobiography precluded a fair use
defense.232 The court stated:
To be sure, many entries in plaintiff's book contain factual and
historical information which is not copyrightable, but the ex-
pression of that information is [copyrightable], particularly in a
case such as this where the expression of those facts is highly
anecdotal. Thus, while the defendants were free to recount his-
torical and biographical facts described in plaintiff's book,...
they could not [appropriate] plaintiff's expression.233
Radi is similar to the situation in Narell in that Freeman did not merely
copy the factual information about the immigration of the Jews. Rather,
she copied Narell's unique expression of those historical facts.234 Radji is
only a district court opinion, so the Narell court was not obligated to
follow the Radji court's ruling. However, because the situation in Radi
is directly applicable to that in Narell, the court should have followed the
logical reasoning found in Radji.
c. Amount & Substantiality of the Portion Used
The third factor in the fair use analysis is the amount and substanti-
ality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole.235 In analyzing this factor, the Narell court found that because
there was no substantial similarity, this factor favored Freeman. 236
However, this conclusion was incorrect. The factor's unstated principle
is that verbatim copying invariably exceeds the purpose of the use.237
Thus, -because Freeman admittedly copied over three hundred words ver-
batim, the court was wrong to find fair use. In Meeropol v. Nizer,238 the
court held that even small takings of a work can preclude a finding of fair
use if the essence of the work was copied.2 39 In Meeropol, defendant's
popular book on the Rosenberg trial used verbatim portions of twenty-
eight copyrighted letters, for a total of 1,957 words. 24' The court consid-
ered this to be substantial even though the section comprised less than
one percent of defendant's total book.24 1
232. Id. at 1301.
233. Id.
234. See supra note 198.
235. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1990).
236. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 914 (9th Cir. 1989).
237. M. LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 302.
238. 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977).
239. Id. at 1069.
240. Id. at 1070-71.
241. Id. at 1071. See also Craft v. Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), where the
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d. Effect on the Market
The fourth factor to be considered in determining fair use - the
effect on the market - has been characterized by case law as being the
most important element.242 This is primarily because "if the market for
the copyright owner's work is harmed, the incentives for creativity that
the copyright monopoly is designed to encourage will not work." '243 The
Narell court found that "the publication of 'Illusions' or books like it has
not had, and is not likely to have, any effect on the value or marketability
of 'Our City.' ,2 However, the court apparently did not consider other
relevant consequences. For instance, Narell could have sold or licensed
"Our City" to other authors, such as Freeman, who may have wished to
write stories based on the theme of "Our City."
Freeman admitted that she consulted Narell's work in writing "Illu-
sions of Love," and that it was the only source she had used; hence, it is
evident that there is a market for such historical narratives. Moreover,
the fact that Freeman encompassed so much of the basis of "Our City" in
"Illusions of Love," limits the likelihood of another author seeking to
license or buy the rights to "Our City." Finally, Freeman's unauthorized
use of "Our City" may prevent Narell from trying to sell the rights of her
novel to a different medium, such as a movie, paperback release, or a
documentary film.
245
The Narell court correctly found that Freeman's use of "Our City"
was commercial. 24' However, the court incorrectly implied that Narell
had the burden of proving that Freeman's commercial use of "Our City"
had an adverse effect on the market of "Our City." Rather, such a bur-
den of proof belonged to Freeman. Harm to potential markets for "Our
City" should have been presumed by the court. Freeman failed to prove
that potential markets would not be affected, and this factor weighs
against a finding of fair use. In Sony Corporation of America,24 7 the
biographer of the musician Igor Stravinsky used excerpts from copyrighted material written by
the composer Robert Craft. Even though the takings were only a small portion of Stravinsky's
biography, they were qualitatively too important to justify the fair use defense.
242. Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
243. M. LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 303.
244. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 914 (9th Cir. 1989).
245. See Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977) (where the court held that the
fact that copyrighted letters had been out of print for over 20 years did not necessarily mean
that they had no future market potential which could be injured) and Craft v. Kobler, 667 F.
Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (where the court found that the potential harm to the market was
the same, despite the fact that the plaintiff's work had been out of print for a number of years).
246. Narell, 872 F.2d at 914.
247. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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Supreme Court maintained that immediate or great effect on a market
was not required. The Court instead held:
What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists. If
the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be
presumed.248
Freeman failed to establish that there was no possible chance that the
potential market for "Our City" would be unharmed and this supports
Narell's position. Thus, the court misapplied the fair use doctrine analy-
sis to incorrectly determine that Freeman's use of "Our City" in "Illu-
sions of Love" was a fair use.
5. Should Historical Research be Copyrightable?
In Narell the court failed to address whether historical research can
be copyrighted. 249 This issue usually arises in cases where a second work
is based upon facts uncovered in the creation of an earlier work.250 Gen-
erally, copyright protection has been denied to historical research, for the
discovery of a fact is not an original work of authorship.25 The ration-
ale behind this rule is that historical research is merely the reporting of
facts.25 2 Since an historical researcher does not discover the information,
he is not an "author" in a constitutional or statutory sense.253 Conse-
quently, courts have continued to deny copyright protection to facts in
histories, biographies, news accounts, and other nonfiction works.
254
However, compelling arguments can be made to support the position
that historical research should be copyrightable. 255 There is a tension in
the case law between protection of the labor and efforts of the researcher
and the need to allow dissemination of historical knowledge.256 Thus,
the law is not settled on this point.
A key example of this tension is found in Miller v. Universal City
248. Id. at 451 (emphasis in original).
249. This is presumably because Narell does not argue the issue. However, it is an issue
which the court could, and should, have addressed.
250. For example, a movie based on a book.
251. M. LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 53 (quoting Rubin v. Boston Magazine Co., 645 F.2d 80
(1st Cir. 1981)).
252. Interview with Lionel Sobel, Professor of Law at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles
(Oct. 28, 1990).
253. Id.
254. Shipley and Hay, Protecting Research: Copyright, Common-Law Alternatives, and Fed-
eral Preemption, 63 N.C. L. REV. 125, 127 (1984).
255. Id. at 126 (emphasis added).
256. Id. at 128-29.
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Studios, Inc. ("Miller").27 In Miller, the plaintiff had spent approxi-
mately 2,500 hours preparing a book entitled "83 Hours Till Dawn"
about a notorious Georgia kidnapping whose victim was imprisoned in
an underground coffin. 258 The defendant, Universal City Studios, was
sued for copyright infringement when it based a movie entirely on the
subject of the book.259 The district court held for Miller, declaring itself
in favor of the copyrightability of research.2 ° The court's rationale was
primarily to reward the effort and ingenuity involved in discovering his-
torical facts. 261 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however,
maintaining that since there was no appropriation of original expression
there was no infringement.262 The court ruled that "[t]o hold that re-
search is copyrightable is no more or no less than to hold that the facts
discovered as a result of research are entitled to copyright protection. "263
The position that historical research should be copyrightable is fur-
ther exemplified by the cases dealing with directories and compilations.
Courts have granted protection to the research required to produce such
items as telephone directories and indexes. 2 " In Leon v. Pacific Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co., 2 65 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found in-
fringement where the defendants copied the plaintiff's telephone
directory and merely rearranged the listings to be in numerical, rather
than alphabetical order.266 By stressing the act of acquiring facts and the
labor required to produce a directory, the court isolated research as the
basis for copyright protection.267
Irena Narell presumably spent a great amount of time and effort in
producing "Our City." Because the subject spanned an entire era, many
themes and many individuals, her research on the history of Jewish im-
migration was obviously expansive. In fact, it is likely that Narell's re-
search may have been more extensive than what would be required to
compile a telephone directory. Thus, the court should have, at a mini-
mum, addressed the issue of the copyrightability of historical research.
To hold that Freeman had infringed upon Narell's copyright by appro-
257. 460 F. Supp. 984 (S.D.Fla. 1978).
258. Id. at 985.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 987-88. The trial court judge instructed the jury that, while facts cannot be
copyrighted, an author's research of factual matters should be protected. Id at 987.
261. Id. at 988.
262. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1372 (5th Cir. 1981).
263. Id. at 1372.
264. SHIPLEY AND HAY, supra note 254, at 126 n.6.
265. 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937).
266. Id. at 486-87.
267. Id
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priating her extensive research would make a substantial impact on the
future of copyright law.
VII. CONCLUSION
The decision of Narell v. Freeman will have a substantial impact on
future ninth circuit decisions involving copyright infringement. The far-
reaching implications of the decision signify that future authors will be
able to use substantial portions of other authors' works when drafting
their own literary creations, but yet not be held liable for copyright in-
fringement. This contravenes the fundamental purpose of copyright law,
which is to prevent unfair appropriation of an author's creativity and
expression.268 Moreover, such a ruling could thwart the desire of future
authors to create literary works because authors may become unwilling
to expend vast time and effort to research and produce a work which can
be copied by someone else. Such a consequence would be very unfortu-
nate, especially because one of the primary goals of copyright law is to
encourage the production of creative works.
The competing goals of copyright law are very difficult to reconcile.
On one hand, courts strive to encourage the creation of works. On the
other hand, courts do not wish to limit the use of facts and ideas. The
court in Morrison v. SolomonS269 expressed this balance of policy best
when it stated:
If the protectable scope of an author's writings is too narrowly
defined he will be discouraged from further writing. If, how-
ever, the protectable scope of the original author's work is too
broadly defined, creative work by other authors will be
discouraged.27 °
Currently, copyright law attempts to accommodate these competing in-
terests by protecting an author's expression, but not the underlying facts
which are expressed. 27' This solution may not be ideal; perhaps another
268. Interview with Lionel Sobel, Professor of Law at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles
(Oct. 28, 1990).
269. 494 F. Supp. 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
270. Id. at 225.
27 1. Sometimes protection is even more limited. The doctrine of Baker v. Selden holds that
where an idea can be expressed in only one way, then even the expression of that idea cannot be
protected by copyright. An example is directions found on a package of picture hangers.
There is basically only one way to describe how to hang a picture (i.e. mark the spot on the
wall, hold the nail, etc.). Thus, a company who produces packaged picture hangers may not
obtain copyright protection for the accompanying directions. Interview with Lionel Sobel,
Professor of Law at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles (Aug. 28, 1990).
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one should be established where an author may receive protection for his
research, unique expression of historical facts or sequencing of events.
Nevertheless, the decision in Narell v. Freeman seems wrong, unless,
of course, you are the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals who believe that
cheaters should prosper and that hard work can go unrewarded.
Barbara Wendy Stearns*
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